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ABSTRACT
IN SEARCH OF THE FAIR JURY:
DOES EXTENDED VOIR DIRE REMEDY THE EFFECTS
OF PRETRIAL PUBLICITY?
by
Hedy Red Dexter
The present study asked two important questions: Does prejudicial pretrial
publicity produce bias which may impair juror objectivity and, if it does,
can voir dire remedy its untoward effects? Subjects were 68 college
undergraduates whose political attitudes had been assessed and who had or
had not read case-specific pretrial publicity one week before viewing a
murder trial. Trial proceedings took place at the University of Miami law
school. Voir dire, trial viewing, and deliberations were conducted in U-
M's moot courtroom. As predicted, analyses revealed main effects for both
voir dire and pretrial publicity such that pretrial publicity increased
conviction rate and the extended voir dire decreased conviction rate, but
the extended voir dire failed to reduce the specific prejudicial effect
of pretrial publicity. These findings suggest that prejudgment of a
general nature (e.g., confusion about legal concepts) may be neutralized
by an extended voir dire but that prejudice specifically created by
exposure to inflammatory news stories is not offset by an extended voir
dire format. There is reason to believe, however, that with more time
spent explaining case facts and with greater attention to individual
jurors, voir dire could eliminate even the specific prejudice created by
pretrial publicity.
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I. Introduction
A. The Right to a Trial by Fair Jurors
In a time when society is motivated to crack down on crime,
it is possible to lose sight of the accused's constitutional rights.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees all
criminal defendants the right to trial by a fair and impartial jury
meaning that, when asked by the judge or lawyer if she can set aside
prejudgments and render a verdict based on case evidence and the law,
the seated juror will answer "yes" and mean it. "Fairness," by law,
means that the juror, in presuming innocence, will force the state to
prove a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt before convicting.
Fairness means that jurors must base their verdicts only on the facts of
the case at bar and on the law. But do ordinary people understand legal
concepts such as presumption of innocence, burden of proof, and
reasonable doubt well enough to agree to fairly apply them? Confusion
about legal concepts is just a part of the problem; juror prejudice
(whatever the source), insofar as it impairs objectivity, also poses a
threat to due process.
In the context of this study, the issue of due process
becomes important. What exactly constitutes justice? In an adversarial
system, the opponents (i.e., trial lawyers) are expected to do their
very best to protect the interests of their respective clients. To the
degree that trial advocates pursue all lines of inquiry--leaving no
stone unturned--one can say that justice is being served. In doing
their jobs, trial adversaries must maximize the likelihood that their
respective clients will emerge victorious. This author maintains that
justice cannot be defined in terms of outcome (i.e., correct verdict)
because, in an absolute sense, the correct verdict (i.e., did the
defendant do the deed or not) is unknowable. Justice, then, is defined
in terms of procedure, not outcome.
It is believed that voir dire, a process which presumably
disqualifies prejudiced jury panelists, protects a defendant's
constitutional right to trial by a fair jury. While the Courts feel
satisfied that voir dire--as it is routinely conducted--offers the
accused adequate protection, others believe that its effectiveness could
be improved. The Department of Justice and the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) disagree as to who--the judge or
defense counsel, respectively--should control the voir dire examination.
Under the current rules judges have complete discretion and usually
prefer to conduct voir dire themselves. In 1983, legislation which
sought to transfer control of voir dire in federal district court was
introduced, by Senator Heflin of Alabama, but failed. Proponents of
change still believe that the judge-conducted voir dire yields little
probative information. Without candid disclosure, trial lawyers cannot
protect their clients from the damaging effects of undetected bias. The
present study tests voir dire as a remedy for juror prejudice.
B. Threats to Sixth Amendment Rights
1. Jurors may not understand the law. Although these
points of law are familiar to all American citizens, there is reason to
believe that their respective meaning and lawful application are not
clearly understood. In fact, a nationwide study revealed that many
jurors did not even know that "Court" referred to the judge (Elwork,
Sales, & Alfini, 1982). More to the point, however, Strawn and Buchanan
(1976) found that 50% of instructed Florida jurors believed that it was
the defendant's burden to prove innocence in a criminal trial. Concern
over misunderstood legal terminology, then, seems entirely appropriate
given that numerous studies demonstrate that jurors misunderstand and
misapply legal concepts at virtually every stage of the trial process
(Buchanan, Pryor, Taylor, & Strawn, 1978; Charrow & Charrow, 1979;
Kagehiro & Stanton, 1985; Kassin, 1985; Kassin & Wrightsman, 1980, 1981,
1985; Schmolesky, Cutler, & Penrod, 1988; Thompson & Schumann, 1987).
For example, research done by Elwork et al. (1977, 1982) as
well as Severance and Loftus (1981, 1982) shows that jurors are confused
by the case law that they are to apply during deliberation.
Specifically, jurors misunderstood definitions of "intent" and
"reasonable doubt." Other evidence suggests that jurors misapply
instructions that limit use of prior convictions in criminal cases (e.
g., Doob & Kirshenbaum, 1973) and in joined trials, judicial
instructions have not been able to offset impressions of defendant
criminality (e.g., Horowitz, Bordens, & Feldman, 1980; Green & Loftus,
1981; Tanford & Penrod, 1982, 1984; Tanford, Penrod, & Collins, 1985).
Findings such as these point out that misunderstanding and/or
misapplication of the law can threaten a defendant's constitutional
right to trial by fair jurors.
There are still other common misperceptions. For example,
people often think that a person charged with a crime must have done
something wrong or they think that the State would not spend time and
money to put on a trial were there not plenty of evidence to convict.
That people generally hold these beliefs is not the problem that
threatens a defendant's constitutional rights. Such beliefs, however,
are a problem when they interfere with a juror's ability to hear trial
evidence objectively. Inability or unwillingness to set aside
prejudgments constitutes failure to presume innocence. Directly related
to presumption of innocence is burden of proof, another point of law
that is commonly misunderstood by ordinary people. Ordinarily,
individuals suspected of wrongdoing are expected to defend their
actions; failure to explain one's actions creates an impression of
guilt. But proof of innocence is not required of criminal defendants--
the burden of proof is the State's alone--no proof, no guilt. People
fail to understand this distinction between everyday life and the
courtroom, and failure to hold the State to its burden constitutes
failure to presume innocence.
Among the more familiar points of law, the concept of
reasonable doubt is the most ambiguous of all. When asked to express
the reasonable doubt standard in percentages, subjects' responses ranged
anywhere from 50 to 100 percent (Kagehiro & Stanton, 1985). Worse yet,
Kagehiro and Stanton (1985) found that standard of proof--be it
preponderance of evidence or reasonable doubt--made no significant
differences in verdict preferences. Clearly, there is sufficient
evidence to suggest that misunderstanding of the law constitutes at
least one threat to a defendant's constitutional right to trial by an
impartial jury.
2. Prejudice arising from personal traits or
direct experience. But there are other threats to a
defendant's constitutional right to trial by a fair jury, factors--which
may arise knowingly or unknowingly--that can impair a juror's ability to
presume innocence. For example, jurors who are friends or relatives of
the litigants may be incapable of objectivity. While some jurors may
not be cause-eligible (i.e., challenges based on specific, provable
prejudice which are unlimited but which must be approved by the judge),
they may, nonetheless, be prejudiced and the number of allowed
peremptory challenges (which are limited but do not require specific
reason or justification) are insufficient to excuse them all. These
prejudices may arise from personal traits such as legal authoritarianism
(Boehm, 1968) or they may be negative attitudes arising from jurors'
firsthand victim experiences, particularly when a juror's experience is
related to the defendant's charged offense, that have been linked to
conviction-proneness (Cutler, Narby, & Moran, 1990; Moran & Comfort,
1982).
3. Coniive mechanisms that mediate rejudice. People
bring prejudice into the courtroom from a number of sources;
misunderstanding of the law, personal traits, and direct experience are
just a few of the ways by which an individual's constitutional right to
presumed innocence is threatened. One goal of this research is to look
at how preconceptions influence subsequent information-processing. Many
trial judges are satisfied that potential jurors who agree to be fair
can be, but judges presume that people generally are aware of the subtle
ways in which prejudice works and that they are willing to admit
prejudice publicly. Presuming instead that jurors are not impartial
information-processors, I turn to the literature with the following
question: Do people, as "intuitive" scientists searching for truth,
process trial evidence rationally and objectively (Kelley, 1967, 1973;
Ross, 1977)? Or is human information-processing subject to motivated
distortions and if it is how can it be offset (Festinger, 1957; Heider,
1958; Adams, 1965; Berkowitz & Walster, 1976)?
A raging controversy among attribution theorists, pits
rational against motivational explanations of human information-
processing. During the Sixties "hot" internal states, e.g., attitude
7change motivated by need to reduce arousal, was the focus of cognitive
dynamics but with the emergence of the computer analogy in the Seventies
and the ensuing cognitive revolution, "hot" cognitive explanations were
supplanted by "cool" information-processing explanations. Theories such
as correspondent inferences (Jones & Davis, 1965) and Kelley's (1967,
1973) covariation model of attribution are two of the more influential
social cognitive theories which portray humans as naive empiricists
whose only information-processing errors are systematic and rational
(e.g., Ross, 1977; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). The goal of "social
cognition," as this emergent field was called, is to explain human
information-processing without invoking motivation. The question is
which of the two positions is best supported by empirical research?
We know from an extensive schema literature that
preconceptions based on past experiences are tenacious, difficult to
dislodge, and are thought to drive subsequent information-processing
(e.g., Bruner & Goodman, 1947; Bruner, 1973; Wyer, 1974, 1975a, 1976;
Wyer & Srull, 1980). Among the earliest and most innovative cognitive
psychologists, Bartlett (1932), even before Bruner's "new look in
perception," portrayed humans as active information-processors. He
postulated theories of learning and remembering that directly impact on
trial settings. According to Bartlett, learning new material requires
"effort after meaning"; that is, encoded memory does not duplicate
reality rather people change new information to fit existing schemas.
Furthermore, Bartlett claimed that remembering, as a reconstructive
process, is not detailed but schematic. Because remembering is based on
general impressions, people recall details that seem correct but may not
be.
Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979), in their classic study on
expectancy confirmation, point out the shortcomings of laypersons as
intuitive scientists. Hypothesizing that data relevant to a particular
belief are not processed impartially, Lord et al. (1979) demonstrated
that subjects on opposite sides of the capital punishment issue found
support for their respective positions despite the fact that they were
given the same relevant empirical evidence. Expectancy confirmation
served to bolster subjects' original positions and polarize the opposing
factions. On recall, subjects characterized the "confirming" evidence
as highly reliable and the "disconfirming" evidence as unreliable.
Because both groups were given the same data but reached polar opposite
conclusions, these findings suggest that people impose their own world
view on available information during decision making. That expectancies
influence perception--particularly person perception--is not news (e.g.,
James, 1890; Snyder, Tanke, & Berscheid, 1977; Snyder & Swann, 1978a;
Zadny & Gerard, 1974; Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978).
Clearly, these findings have implications for the constitutional issues
at hand.
4. The "story-model" as a rational explanation. Other
researchers ignore the effects of preconceptions on jury decisions. For
example, Pennington and Hastie (1986) suggest that jurors construct a
cohesive story from trial evidence and then match the "story" with the
"best fitting" verdict category. According to Pennington et al. (1986)
the story is the schema or mental representation that determines verdict
choice. My reading of the schema literature suggests that causality
moves instead from verdict to story construction, that one's impression
(schema) of guilt or innocence influences not only jurors' encoding of
trial testimony but also retrieval of case facts to support verdict
choice.
Although the "story model" is supposed to explain juror
behavior, it fails to address some important questions. For example,
what is driving information-processing while jurors listen to testimony?
It cannot be the story (i.e., the schema) because the story is not
finished until the trial is over, according to Pennington and Hastie
(1986). Do they mean to say that jurors do not consider the question of
guilt or innocence until they have heard all testimony and are ready to
deliberate? To support their argument Pennington et al. (1986) claim
that subjects making different verdict choices constructed different
stories. It is easy to understand how stories would be consistent with
verdict choice and that the stories are different depending on verdict
choice. But what produced the different stories in the first place? If
it is true that verdict assignment is made after a plausible story has
10
been constructed, then what contributes to differences in story
construction? They all hear the same testimony, why then do people
receiving identical information construct different stories? Lord,
Ross, and Lepper (1979) and others (e.g., Bartlett, 1932; Bruner, 1973;
Bruner & Goodman, 1947) would suggest that preexisting hypotheses (e.g.,
stereotypes, world view) drive the processing of trial testimony.
Pennington and Hastie (1986) assessed story "cohesiveness"
(i.e., does it hang together or contain the necessary components of
episode schema). The problem with measuring cohesiveness is that most
people, when asked to tell a story, will make it sound plausible because
to do otherwise would reflect badly on them. It is possible that the
story hangs together because subjects were instructed to tell a story
and not because of any memory representation that is called up to help
make verdict decisions. Story cohesiveness, then, may be an
experimental artifact due to instructional set. The question, then,
seems to be one of causal order. There is much evidence to suggest that
prospective jurors come into the trial situation with a verdict
preference, or at least inclination, either based on preconceptions
about how certain classes of people behave (e.g., Taylor, 1982; Hastie,
1980; Wyer & Srull, 1980; Snyder & Uranowitz, 1978) or prejudgments
resulting from exposure to pretrial information (e.g., pretrial
publicity; Carroll, Kerr, Alfini, Weaver, MacCoun & Feldman, 1986; Moran
& Cutler, in press) and construct the story (i.e., select evidence) that
supports their predetermined preference (Lord et al. 1979).
5. Pretrial publicity may jeoardize objectivity. Recently
the controversy over free press versus fair trial has created a stir.
As yet another factor that has been found to jeopardize juror
objectivity, pretrial publicity may threaten a defendant's
constitutional right to a fair trial. But before examining whether or
not exposure to pretrial publicity prejudices jurors against a
defendant, it should be pointed out that there are interpretational
problems associated with the concept of juror prejudice that may bear on
resolution of the ongoing debate. The issue is two-fold including
problems with definition and practical application.
On the one hand, social scientists attempting to demonstrate
the biasing effects of prejudicial pretrial publicity, define prejudice
as a state of mind that differentially inclines one toward a particular
litigant (Moran & Cutler, in press). The courts, rejecting generic
definitions of prejudice, claim that social science findings reveal an
"inadequate understanding of the way pretrial publicity influences the
thought processes of prospective jurors" (American Bar Association,
1978, p. 20). The problem centers on the law's disinterest in defining
prejudice in general terms, concentrating instead on prejudice as it
idiosyncratically bears on specific cases. From a legal perspective,
then, prejudice must be defined contextually and cannot, as social
scientists typically do, operationally defined for use in standard
12
methodologies.
Complicating the issue even further, the law circularly
defines prejudice as the inability to serve as a fair and impartial juror.
"Impartiality," however, is not a technical term it is a state of mind,
and as such requires operational definition before its existence can be
determined. Unfortunately, there are no hard and fast rules to determine
whether or not prejudice exists (Irvin v. Dowd, 1961). The Supreme Court
does, however, specify that neither knowledge, abhorrence, nor perceived
notions regarding a defendant's actions constitute prejudice; rather,
prejudice must be an ongoing phenomenon. In the legal sense, prejudice
has been defined as a "fixed" opinion held by the prospective juror that,
given the circumstances surrounding a particular case, cannot be changed
(Murphy v. Florida, 1975).
A. How Pretrial Publicity Mediates Prejudice
How exactly does pretrial publicity create prejudice in either
the social science or the jurisprudential sense? First of all, the media
are not held to very high standards. For example what they report
(newspaper as well as TV coverage) does not have to be accurate which is
why there is an open editorial policy. Details reported by the media are
not evidence. News stories are designed to get attention and to do so
they are often exaggerated, inflammatory, and sensational; news is
designed that way to create a certain impression and because it sells
newspapers. Unfortunately, once that impression has been created it is
difficult to remember that it is not based on the facts.
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Secondly, often what is reported in the media is information
that ordinarily would not be admitted in the courtroom, information such
as a defendant's prior criminal record or general misbehavior. The
reason this kind of information is not admitted in the courtroom is
because of its prejudicial effect and that is why officers of the law,
both judges and attorneys, ask prospective jurors if they have read or
heard about the case. For example, knowing that the defendant has a
prior arrest or conviction record gives the impression of criminality
and it is this impression that interferes with the ability to limit
judgment to the case facts. But just as it is unconstitutional to deny
any defendant the right to trial by a fair and impartial jury it is,
likewise, unconstitutional to deny freedom of the press. In the
interest of justice, one goal of voir dire should be to make jurors
aware of how pretrial publicity creates prejudice so that they, because
they want to be fair, will recognize prejudice in themselves and either
choose to excuse themselves or put prejudgment aside.
Pretrial publicity mediates prejudice in yet other ways.
For example, surveys conducted by Moran and Cutler (in press) and by
Costantini and King (1980/1981) found that knowledge of pretrial
publicity is significantly correlated with perceived defendant
culpability; that is, people who remember publicity details (most
pretrial publicity is biased against the defendant) are more likely to
believe that there is a lot of evidence against the defendant. Pretrial
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publicity statements are made most often by prosecutors and law
enforcement agents, credible professionals whose word often goes
unchallenged. Other evidence suggests that publicity of an emotional
nature is more prejudicial than publicity that is factual (Taylor &
Fiske, 1978; Nisbett, Borgida, Crandall, & Reed, 1976) and that people
tend to remember information that supports their theory about how
certain classes of people behave (Neisser, 1976; Snyder & Uranowitz,
1978; Taylor, 1982; Taylor & Crocker, 1980).
People are more likely to remember news details that are
schema-consistent, and we know that information availability affects
later judgments (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 1974). In a drug trial,
then, media facts that support a personal theory about drug users are
recalled best and not only strengthen one's theory about drug users but
also affect one's ability to evaluate the trial evidence objectively.
But reinforcing or strengthening an already existing theory about
certain categories of people is not the only way that pretrial publicity
affects objectivity. Where prejudice against members of certain classes
does not already exist, pretrial publicity, because it is vivid,
inflammatory, and sensational, can create negative impressions that
jurors would not otherwise have (Nisbett, et al., 1976; Taylor & Fiske,
1978); the biasing process is subtle and most people are unaware of its
effects (e.g., Neisser, 1976; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).
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D. Studies of the Effects of Pretrial Publicity and
Legal Safeguards
News covering the details of the crime, the charge, the
defendant's prior criminal record, as well as attorneys' and witnesses
comments may affect jurors' attitudes toward the defendant, particularly
when the publicity is inflammatory. In criminal cases, prejudice (of
which jurors are often unaware), may contaminate juror information-
processing making fairness and impartiality virtually impossible.
Actual Supreme Court cases (e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 1961; Rideau v.
Louisiana, 1963; Sheppard v. Maxwell, 1966) illustrate this contention.
A review of empirical simulation techniques, however, leaves
many questions unanswered. It is worth mentioning that after two
decades of research, the fewer than a dozen studies addressing these
issues yield little usable knowledge (Carroll et al., 1986). To
simplify this discussion, I have organized the relevant research
findings according to their respective methodologies beginning with
surveys of community opinion. Although a number of survey studies show
that impressions created by pretrial publicity influence perceptions of
defendant culpability, none have demonstrated that pretrial publicity
directly influences juror verdicts (e.g., Moran & Cutler, in press;
Costantini & King, 1980/1981). Several studies assessed the effects of
pretrial publicity on perceptions of guilt where subjects received no
case facts other than those contained in news accounts. Various
16
categories of pretrial publicity, that are presumed by the American Bar
Association to produce prejudice in the average news consumer, were
found to create a prejudicial attitude. Reports of a defendant's
confession (DeLuca, 1979; Tans & Chaffee, 1966; Wilcox & McCombs, 1967),
prior record (DeLuca, 1979; Hvistendahl, 1979), and failed polygraph
(DeLuca, 1979) were found to increase guilty ratings but, because no
case facts were presented beyond the news articles themselves, these
impressions of guilt cannot be generalized to juror verdicts.
More interesting are studies that examined media impact on
jury verdicts by exposing subjects to pretrial news and then showing
trial transcripts or videotaped trial reenactment. Typically tested,
along with the effects of pretrial publicity, are one or the other
popular safeguards used by the court to offset its prejudicial impact.
One pioneering study that examined the impact of pretrial publicity on
juror verdicts concluded that judicial admonitions cured the potential
adverse effects created by either factual or sensational newspaper
clippings about a murder case (Simon, 1966). The study, however,
suffered methodologically (e.g., the State's case was especially weak
and the design lacked conditions without judicial admonitions). Other
simulated jury studies, where juror verdicts are elicited, do yield
effects for news exposure that are not remedied by judicial admonitions
(e.g., Padawer-Singer & Barton, 1975; Sue, Smith & Gilbert, 1974; Kline
& Jess, 1966; Tans & Chaffee, 1966). For example, subjects in the Sue,
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Smith, and Gilbert (1974) study read newspaper accounts claiming that a
gun found in the defendant's room either was or was not the murder
weapon, information which, in either case, is inadmissable due to an
illegal search. Subjects were either admonished or not by the court to
disregard what they had read. After reading a one-page summary of the
case, subjects gave verdicts and rated the strength of the cases for the
prosecution and for the defense. Unlike Simon's (1966) findings, Sue et
al. (1974) found that subjects' verdicts were influenced by the news
coverage and that judicial admonitions failed to offset its effects.
This is not surprising since the amount of information contained in a
one-page case summary was insufficient to compete with sensationalized
news stories.
Neither did jury deliberation attenuate the effects of
prejudicial news coverage. For example, Kline and Jess (1966), found
that, despite judicial admonitions, their four juries referred to
prejudicial news reports during deliberation and that one jury actually
based its verdict partly on the media coverage. Zanzola (1977) also
found deliberation effects for news stories despite the fact that media
bias was not reflected in predeliberation verdicts. Although news
coverage of the defendant was of a positive nature, it shows,
nonetheless, that deliberation can exaggerate rather than diminish the
effects of pretrial publicity.
Besides judicial admonitions and jury deliberation, attempts
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to offset the untoward effects of pretrial publicity with voir dire--the
remedy in which judges most strongly believe--have also failed. Sue,
Smith and Pedroza (1975) found that subjects who disclosed personal
prejudice were more likely to convict than those who did not but that
the effect remained among those who claimed impartiality. Padawer-
Singer, Singer, and Singer (1974) found differences among subjects who
were voir dired versus those who did not undergo the voir dire
examination for prejudice. Surprisingly, voir dire, which was supposed
to decrease convictions among subjects exposed to prejudicial media
accounts, instead increased the number of convictions among subjects who
read neutral news stories.
What can be made, then, of the extant empirical research on
the effects of pretrial publicity on juror judgments? Otto, Penrod, and
Hirt (1990) claim that the current research disallows conclusive answers
to questions about when and how news coverage affects the defendant's
right to a fair trial. And based on their review of the literature on
the effects of pretrial publicity, Carroll et al, (1986) conclude that
"our understanding of the effects of news coverage is still
fragmentary.. .there is evidence that [pretrial publicity] effects can
carry through a trial to jury verdict, but there is very little evidence
regarding the effectiveness of various remedies applied by the court."
Although there continues to be substantial interest among
legal psychologists in the particular prejudicial effects of pretrial
19
publicity on juror judgments, it is misleading to market this research
(and it often is) as the "free press/fair trial" controversy--it is not
as though we can choose between them--because free press is a permanent
feature of democracy. Calling the problem free press versus fair trial
is to misstate it. The real problem concerns the issue of
constitutional rights, that is, a defendant's right to be presumed
innocent until and unless the state meets its burden of proof. Because
pretrial publicity tends to exacerbate or even create prejudice where it
did not exist, it makes a good vehicle for determining what, if any,
influence prejudgments have on verdicts as well as for comparing the
remedial effectiveness of different voir dire formats.
While the courts concede that pretrial publicity may
prejudice prospective jurors against criminal defendants, they are
confident that legal safeguards, namely change of venue, judicial
admonitions, and voir dire, are effective remedies. Moving the trial,
for one, is undesirable because it is (a) inconvenient and (b) at odds
with the constitutional provision that a case be tried in accordance
with the standards of the community in which the crime was committed.
Concern over whether change of venue is a corrective for pretrial
publicity prejudice has been expressed for yet another reason. While
pretrial publicity can exacerbate preexisting prejudice it is not known
when pretrial publicity is the original source, and that moving the
trial cannot guarantee that the alternative community will be prejudice-
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free (Carroll et al., 1986). Public opinion surveys used for changes of
venue seek to establish a link between exposure to pretrial publicity
and prejudgment about a case (e.g., Nietzel & Dillehay, 1986; Vidmar &
Judson, 1981). But, as Carroll et al. note (1986), it is difficult to
know whether the differences observed are due to news coverage or
preexisting attitudes correlated with selective reading by media
consumers. The present research addressed this question. In sum it is
interesting to note, that despite the cost and inconvenience to the
courts, legal psychologists continue to involve themselves in venue
change issues rather than exploring ways to remedy prejudice through
improved use of voir dire.
E. Shortcomings of Voir Dire: The Most Poular Safeguard
Clearly, voir dire is the most popular of the court's
safeguards against prejudice. The trial judge decides who will conduct
the voir dire examination and how extensive it will be. In terms of
disclosing juror prejudice, there are problems with both the federal
(judge-conducted) and state (attorney-conducted) models. Each will be
discussed in turn beginning with attorney-conducted models.
There are two approaches or goals of attorney-conducted voir
dire and ultimately its effectiveness may depend on how it is used.
Typically, voir dire is used as a jury selection procedure. The goal
here is simple: identify and excuse individuals who, wittingly or
unwittingly, reveal prejudice. There is, however, reason to doubt the
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efficacy of voir dire if used as a selection procedure. The point is
that attorneys are given a limited number of peremptory challenges per
trial. Given that some degree of prejudice is natural and therefore
pervasive it is illogical to think that voir dire will eliminate it all.
This is true as long as the number of prejudiced venirepersons
outnumbers available peremptory challenges. Concentrating exclusively
on improving jury "selection" methods is ill advised because the result
(using simple mathematics) will still be a prejudiced jury.
There is another reason to suspect that jury selection does
not eliminate pretrial publicity prejudice. During the selection
process, attorneys typically question some subgroup of the larger jury
panel. Even if the attorney selects with perfect accuracy people who
are prejudiced, once an attorney's peremptories have been used up she or
he has to take whomever is next in line--possibly people who are at
least as prejudiced as those excused.
Trial attorneys, however, are not always allowed to conduct
the voir dire examination and, despite its shortcomings when used as a
selection procedure, it may, nevertheless, do better at producing an
impartial jury than its alternative, the judge-conducted voir dire.
When designed properly, questions put to jurors during voir dire can
reveal personal attitudes on any given topic. However, when the wrong
questions are asked or if jurors feel pressured, disclosures of
prejudice may be suppressed (O'Connell, 1988). If the fairness of jury
22
selection depends on the nature and the extent of questioning during
voir dire, then Hennenberg and DeVan (1987) ask:
What does a judge expect when she asks a prospective juror
if he has any broad-based bias or prejudice? Do judges
really think that an individual will answer, 'Yes, I feel
all Columbians charged with cocaine conspiracy are probably
guilty?' (p. 20).
It is doubtful that people will be so candid especially when
the socially desirable response shifts the attention from oneself to
someone else. Typically, the last question the trial judge asks is
whether the juror can render a fair and impartial verdict and if
answered in the affirmative the juror qualifies to sit on the jury
(Irvin v. Dowd, 1961). Practices such as these directly bear on the
present study and are summarized best by O'Connell (1988):
This methodology is a little like asking a practicing
alcoholic if he has his drinking under control; we are
asking the person who has the prejudice to determine if the
prejudice will affect his decision (p. 183).
Unfortunately, this type of voir dire format--where jurors are unlikely
to expose prejudice--has been approved by the Supreme Court. To-date,
no better method has been developed (O'Connell, 1988).
Believing still that voir dire can be the most effective
among traditional judicial remedies, Penrod and Linz (1984) suggest some
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alternative goals. They recommend that attorneys use voir dire to:
explain and emphasize points of law making them available during
deliberation; build rapport; and solicit public commitments from jurors.
For purposes of the present study, these suggestions form the core
around which the attorney-extended voir dire was patterned. In
addition, questions as to the effects of prejudicial pretrial publicity
need to be answered. By showing that incriminating news stories impede
juror objectivity and by testing different strategies for voir dire--the
favorite of judicial remedies--the present study attempts to provide
some answers to these pressing, contemporary questions.
1. Cognitive and social sychology principles in
voir dire. The better approach to voir dire, then, is
education rather than elimination. If complete elimination of prejudice
is impossible (not enough peremptories to excuse all prejudiced jurors)
then attorneys must instead use voir dire to help jurors behave in
accordance with the law. Rather than attempting to weed out prejudice,
the goal of voir dire becomes committing the jury to uphold the law.
Individuals who come into the courtroom with preexisting prejudice
(whatever its source) can be persuaded, using cognitive and social
psychological principles such as availability, commitment and
accountability, to suspend judgment.
Penrod and Linz (1984) suggest a number of ways to improve
the current use of voir dire. As already discussed, there is
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considerable evidence to suggest that jurors misunderstand and misapply
the law. In addition to concentrating on removing biased jurors, trial
attorneys might put voir dire to better use by first explaining relevant
legal concepts. Confused jurors could be made to understand what
specific points of law mean and how to apply them lawfully. From a
cognitive perspective, lawful meanings and applications would then be
available during deliberation where before confusion existed (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974).
Research done by Snyder (1982) suggests that, if integrated,
cognitive and social psychological principles can bear directly on juror
decisionmaking. For example, in the area of attitude-behavior
consistency, findings suggest that attitudes that are both "available"
and "relevant" are more likely translated into action (Snyder, 1982).
Be it an attitude about a specific class of people or understanding of
relevant legalities, when asked during voir dire, the average juror may
not have answers readily available. For many individuals, this may be
the first time they have been asked to consider feelings about someone
who has previously been convicted of a criminal offense or the concept
of reasonable doubt to name but two legal concepts that might be
introduced during a criminal trial. By drawing out commonly held
misconceptions and by soliciting public commitments to fairly apply the
law as they now understand it, attorneys can facilitate impartiality
during juror decisionmaking. Snyder's (1982) findings suggest that
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correspondence between correct understanding of legal concepts and their
lawful application during deliberation is more likely when jurors are
asked to carefully consider and then agree to apply appropriate laws
during decisionmaking.
From an extensive literature on persuasion and attitude
change we know that individuals experience discomfort when they perceive
inconsistency between their attitudes and behavior (Festinger, 1957).
This need to see oneself as consistent motivates people to follow
through on behaviors that they publicly commit to (Kiesler, 1971). In
fact, persons who make public commitments to one side or another of a
particular issue are less likely to be persuaded later on by counter-
messages (Kiesler & Sakumura, 1966). Public commitment can also
determine whether or not forewarning influences attitude change. For
example, Kiesler (1971) found that subjects, who did not publicly
express their position and who were told to expect that others would
attempt to change their minds, abandoned their original beliefs in
anticipation of the forewarned attack. In contrast, subjects from whom
public commitments were solicited became more extreme in their original
positions when forewarned. The potential for social psychology to
address matters of constitutional right is summarized best by Snyder
(1982) who notes:
If there is one message that comes through loud and clear
from generations of research in social psychology, that
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message is the power of situational forces to influence
social behavior. Peer group pressures, reference group
norms, role requirements, incentives and sanctions may
singly and together appear to be impossible to ignore (p.
114).
Fashioning a voir dire that utilizes cognitive and social psychological
principles is the primary goal of the present research.
F. Overview of the Experiment
1. Brief description of the esi and rocedure. The
present study was designed to compare an extended voir dire with the
federal model for its ability to reduce prejudice in general and/or
prejudice associated with pretrial publicity. As Carroll et al., (1986)
note, the effectiveness of traditional jury selection as a remedy for
pretrial publicity rests on at least two assumptions. The first is that
jurors have cognitive access to the source of prejudice--be it pretrial
publicity or past experiences--and the other is that prospective jurors
are willing to report prejudice in any of its forms. That defense
attorneys feel frustrated when the Court asks jury panelists whether
they can be fair and jurors perfunctorily reply, "Sure, I think I can
be," is a restatement of the problem only expressed from the legal
perspective (Hennenberg & DeVan, 1987).
In the only study of its kind, Jones (1987) found that the
source of voir dire (judge or attorney) and delivery style (formal or
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casual) has differential impact on juror disclosure. Measuring
discrepancies between pretested juror attitudes (questionnaire) and
attitudes expressed publicly during voir, Jones demonstrated that jurors
change their responses almost twice as much before a judge than before
an attorney. These results support the contention that potential jurors
disclose more candidly with attorneys probably because a judge's status
pressures them toward compliance to a set of perceived judicial
standards.
With this in mind, I tested the efficacy of an extended voir
dire strategy--where attorneys seek to educate rather than eliminate
prejudice--against the minimalist judge-federal model. Using a four-
fold (henceforth to be called "attorney-extended") format I intend to:
(a) provide "insights" as to the prejudicial effects of pretrial
publicity; (b) call jurors' attention to the relevant points of law and
explain what is meant by them; (c) elicit individual and public
commitments to comply with the law; and (d) make jurors accountable (to
each other) for their actions. I predicted that combining insight,
public commitment, and juror accountability will (a) focus jurors'
attention on the evidence and (b) convince jurors to keep the burden of
proof on the government. This should (c) ensure that jurors hold the
government to its burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and
should be manifested in a reduced conviction-rate.
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2. The problem of experimental realism. Legal
psychologists know how difficult it is to effect policy change in the
legal system. On a number of issues, social science findings have been
offered to the courts (e.g., death qualification) but have been rejected
on the grounds that empirical studies do not approximate the real world.
Clearly, our research goals and methods must appeal to the legal system
before they will take proper notice. For this reason attempting to
improve voir dire, which is the most popular legal remedy for prejudice,
seemed the most productive research choice. As Carroll et al. (1986)
point out, research using realistic cases, publicity, and involved
parties or shadow juries--methodologies that could enhance experimental
realism--are inconvenient, time-consuming, and expensive. Voir dire
conducted by practicing local attorneys in a realistic courtroom
setting, as a first-of-its-kind methodology, seemed like a reasonable
compromise. Finally, it is important to say, that our goal is not
simply to identify problems inherent in the legal system but to work
within it and improve what, with all its faults, is an essentially sound
institution.
3. Predictions. Based on cognitive and social
psychological theory as well as on empirical findings reported in the
psycholegal literature, I predict (A) a main effect for pretrial
publicity such that subjects exposed to PTP will convict significantly
more often than subjects not exposed. As for voir dire, several
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possibilities are entertained. If (B) voir dire reduces only general
bias (and not specific bias such as PTP), I should observe an
unqualified main effect for voir dire such that subjects in the
attorney-extended condition convict less often than subjects in the
judge-federal voir dire. If (C) voir dire reduces only specific bias,
then I should observe no main effect for voir dire but an interaction
showing that the simple main effect for PTP is significantly smaller
among subjects in the attorney-extended condition as compared with
subjects in the judge-federal voir dire condition. If (D) voir dire
reduces both general and specific biases, then I should observe both the
main effect (B) and the interaction with PTP (C). If voir dire reduces
neither bias, the main effect (B) and interaction (C) would be
nonsignificant.
II. Method
A. Experimental Design
The design is a fully-crossed two-way factorial where
factors are (a) voir dire (judge-federal, attorney-extended) and (b)
pretrial publicity (case-specific pretrial publicity, NO pretrial
publicity). Subjects in the No pretrial publicity conditions read
general interest news stories.
8. Subject cruient
Sixty eight subjects were recruited from a variety of
courses, e.g., introductory psychology, legal psychology, developmental
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psychology, memory and cognition and were given extra credit for their
participation.
1. Characteristics of th sa m . The demographics
breakdown of the sample is as follows: Sex: male=28%; female=72%; Age:
17-29=74%; 30-39=13%; 40-49=1%; Race: white=54%; black=13%;
hispanic=28%; other=4%; Marital status: never married=69%; divorced
(single)=12%; married=19%; Number of Children: 0=77%; 1=16%; 2=6%; 3=1%;
Prior Jury Service: criminal jury=7%; civil jury=6%.
C. Procedures
1. Preliminaries. The week prior to the actual
proceedings, demographic and the Juror Bias Scale surveys were
administered in those psychology classes included in the sample.
Following completion of the questionnaires, news packets were
distributed. This was done in class to insure that subjects would read
and, for those receiving pretrial publicity, rehearse the newspaper
information.
2. Voir dire. All proceedings took place at the University
of Miami law school. Voir dire, trial viewing, and deliberations were
conducted in U-M's moot courtroom. Subjects were randomly assigned to
one of the two voir dire conditions. Successive voir dire examinations
were conducted in the courtroom by the same legal ensemble (i.e., judge,
prosecutor, defense attorney) beginning with the judge-federal voir
dire. During voir dire, and afterward, subjects (whose turn was either
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over or not up yet) waited in a common area. Subjects in the attorney-
extended condition waited fifteen minutes while subjects went through
voir dire by the judge. Attorneys admonished subjects not to discuss
anything relevant to the trial.
3. Trial viewing. After both groups had gone through voir
dire, subjects were reassembled in the courtroom to view the videotaped
trial. Four 19-inch TV monitors, strategically positioned for easy
viewing, were used to show the trial. At the trial's end, subjects were
assigned to juries and moved to deliberation rooms.
4. Jury deliberation. Just before deliberation, subjects
completed the predeliberation survey. This was done independently
rather than as a group. When done, subjects deliberated for one hour or
until they reached a unanimous decision. All deliberations were
recorded on audiotape. After deliberation, subjects completed the
postdeliberation survey and were debriefed.
D. Stimulus Materials
1. Case-specific pretrial publicity. All media packets
contained seven news accounts of the murder case on which our stimulus
trial is based. Articles were from the front page (including headlines)
and from elsewhere in the newspaper. The articles were shuffled within
each packet to avoid clustering of specific types of information.
Subjects within a condition received identical news packets. Included
in the publicity packet were seven fictionalized news articles all built
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on the original media coverage of the stimulus case, a Milwaukee,
Wisconsin murder. Starting with the basic case facts, statements about
the defendant's prior criminal record, character, retracted confession,
drug use, and physical abusiveness have been added to each article,
information that the ABA has called "highly prejudicial." Dexter,
Penrod, and Linz (1988) found that excessive negativity in a news story
reduced its prejudicial effect so care was taken not to overdo the
inflammatory tone of each article. All the "fictionalized" articles
have the appearance of typical news stories in style, language, and
format.
2. General interest news. Subjects received a publicity
packet that contained 10 local interest-type, noncrime-related news
stories. These are originals that were not modified.
3. The Trial. The original trial was a six hour videotaped
mock trial based on an actual criminal case from the State Bar of
Wisconsin (i.e., Trial of a Criminal Case, 1982). The state charged the
defendant with first degree murder, contending that the victim was
murdered after he made a pass at the defendant's girlfriend and that
there may have been some involvement with drugs. Witnesses testified
that the defendant had been holding the gun at the time of the shooting.
The Defense, on the other hand, claimed that there were no eyewitnesses
to the actual shooting. Also, a forensic expert testified that the
bullet traveled at a 45 degree angle through the head of the deceased
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and would have to have been fired by a person positioned right next to
him. Witnesses, however, testified that the defendant had been standing
8 to 10 feet away from the deceased when the shot was fired.
The videotape was filmed in an actual courtroom from a
juror's perspective. Playing the roles of judge, prosecutor, and
defense counsel in the videotaped reenactment are the individuals who
actually tried the case. The witness roles are played by actors. The
videotaped reenactment followed the actual trial format beginning with
the prosecution and defense opening statements; direct- and cross-
examination of four witnesses; prosecution and defense closing
arguments; and standard instructions from the judge. The reenactment is
well done and compelling. Because jury simulation studies have been
criticized justifiably on the grounds that they lack experimental
realism, we did an exhaustive search for just the right trial. In an
effort to avoid ceiling effects for defendant guilt some of the more
incriminating testimony was edited out. The trial testimony ideally
should be balanced to allow equally for either guilty and not guilty
verdicts; evidence that is even-handed or ambiguous creates an
opportunity for juror judgments to be influenced by personal prejudice.
Pretesting showed this to be the case, n=10; Guilty=60%; Not Guilty=40%.
It should be noted also that the real jury in this case deadlocked.
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E. epnnt Variables
1. Voir dire. Two different voir dire formats were used.
The "judge-federal" voir dire is a bare-bones type of examination
typically used in the federal courts. It relies on perfunctory
questions (usually there is only one socially desirable response)
requiring only a "yes" or "no" response (Jurywork, 1979). In contrast,
the "attorney-extended" voir dire allows attorneys considerable
latitude. Seasoned local attorneys play the roles of prosecutor and
defense counsel in both voir dire conditions.
a. Judge-federal. The standard voir dire
examination, consisting of approximately 10 general questions, was
conducted by the judge (federal model). These questions, which when put
to the jury are supposed to probe the jury panel for prejudice, tend to
be superficial and give little opportunity for those queried to disclose
anything at all. Questions like:
Is there anyone on this jury panel who cannot, or will not,
try this case fairly and impartially, based solely on the
evidence that is received here in court, and under the
instructions on the law as given to you by the court, and
render a just and true verdict?
is the kind typically asked by the judge and often by attorneys during
voir dire. Most standard voir dire questions are asked to ascertain
whether members of the jury panel know any of the trial principals
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(e.g., attorneys, defendant, victim, witnesses, law enforcement
officers, experts, etc.) or have any personal interest in the case at
bar (for a transcript of the judge-federal voir dire please refer to
Appendix D).
b. Attorney-extended. Before putting questions
directly to prospective jurors, attorneys conducting the "attorney-
extended" voir dire offered insights as to (a) the nature of prejudice,
e.g., as a result of personal experiences, stereotyping, pretrial
publicity; as well as (b) commonly misunderstood points of law, e.g.,
burden of proof, presumption of innocence, and standards of proof. In
so doing, correct application of these points of law were made available
for use during juror decision making.
It has been argued in the psycholegal literature that voir
dire does not effectively weed out prejudice because prospective jurors,
like most people, are unaware of its existence in themselves (Carroll et
al., 1986). Defense counsel used voir dire first as an opportunity to
explain how prejudice works and the questions themselves, when put to
the jury panel, elicited from them commitments to set aside prejudice.
Rather than condemning prejudice, which makes its disclosure highly
unlikely, defense counsel took a different tack. He began by insisting
that we are all prejudiced--that it is essentially human--and in the
interest of justice we must try to recognize prejudice in ourselves so
that we may set it aside. Public commitment and accountability--
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reliable social phenomena--served to guide me in this process. Based on
empirical findings we expected that the juror who publicly pledges to
suspend judgment and who would have to justify her or his verdict
decision during deliberation is likely to uphold that commitment
(Tetlock, 1983). We know also that people are motivated to reduce
inconsistency between their attitudes and behavior (Festinger, 1957).
With this approach the goal of voir dire shifts from elimination (for
prejudice) to education (from prejudice) and is a process that
reinforces rather than punishes honest disclosure.
Contrasts between the judge-federal and attorney-extended
voir dire conditions were sharply defined in terms of length, content,
and rapport. For example, the judge-federal voir dire was brief (only
fifteen minutes long), the questions were more like statements to which
jurors would perfunctorily respond, and no attempt was made by the judge
to establish rapport between himself and individual jurors. In
contrast, the attorney-extended voir dire was an hour long during which
time defense counsel provided insights on commonly misunderstood points
of law. By engaging in a question/response dialogue with individuals
jurors, defense counsel not only established rapport but supplied
clarifications on crucial points of law where confusions previously
existed. Most importantly, defense counsel elicited public commitments
to objectivity from a number of juror/subjects. The prosecutor, in the
attorney-extended voir dire, played a non-role in the sense that her
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questioning (three questions) was patterned after the perfunctory judge-
style only briefer.
F. Preliminary Assessments
1. Pretrial prejudice. Prior to viewing the videotaped
trial, subjects completed the Juror Bias Scale developed by Kassin and
Wrightsman (1983). These data gave me some idea of my subjects'
prejudices before they were subjected to experimental manipulations.
Kassin and Wrightsman (1983) found that the instrument (a) reliably
predicted individual differences, i.e., legal authoritarianism versus
civil libertarianism; (b) was not influenced by social desirability
factors; and, for our purposes, (c) allows for assessment of
randomization effectiveness. Questions such as "If a suspect runs from
the police, then he probably committed the crime;" "Out of every 100
people brought to trial, at least 75 are guilty of the crime with which
they are charged;" and "Too many innocent people are wrongfully
imprisoned" were among those included.
2. Rehearsal of pretrial publicity. Before viewing the
stimulus trial, subjects received a publicity packet. Materials were
distributed and read in class after which subjects reported, in open-
ended format, (a) if they had an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of
each murder defendant and (b) what evidence could they cite to support
their opinion. Forcing immediate rehearsal of the inflammatory and
incriminating publicity details was an attempt to maximize its
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prejudicial effects.
G. Dependent Measures
1. Pre eraion survey. At the trial's end but before
deliberation began subjects were asked (again, in open-ended format) to
state, in story form, their verdict preference and all supporting
evidence. Subjects also gave us verdict confidence ratings. To measure
the impact of witness testimony on jury decision making, subjects were
asked to rate, on 9-point Likert rating scales, (a) credibility of each
witness and (b) strength of prosection's and defense's case. It was
important to determine whether or not there were any voir dire effects
(i.e., education) before deliberation where any voir dire effects could
be masked by the effects of social influence. This constitutes the
second attitude assessment--an opportunity to determine whether or not
preexisting attitudes (schemas) prevail or can be unseated by first
providing jurors with insight as to how prejudice works and by, second,
eliciting from them individual public commitments to objectivity.
2. Postdeliberation survey. In addition to verdict and
confidence in verdict, items in this survey assessed jurors' self-
reported skills at persuasion. Questions like: "To what extent did you
contribute to deliberation," and "To what extent did you assert your
particular point of view" were rated on 9-point scales. With this
information we may make some connection between a certain world view,
dominance in groups, and verdict preferences.
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III. Results
A. Descriptive Statistics
Insert Table 1 about here
The descriptive statistics are displayed in Table 1. Forty
one percent of the subjects convicted in their predeliberation verdicts,
indicating that the case was slightly biased toward the defense. This
is also evident from the case strength ratings. The mean prosecution
and defense case strength ratings were close to the scale midpoint,
although the defense's case was rated as slightly stronger. The
predeliberation verdicts, postdeliberation verdicts, and case strength
ratings were highly intercorrelated. Scores on the Juror Bias Scale and
subscales were normally distributed and correlated in the expected
direction with the culpability measures. Some of these correlations
attained statistical significance.
B.Predelieration verdict.
Predeliberation verdict served as the primary dependent
variable in a two (Judge-federal v. Attorney-extended voir dire) by two
(pretrial publicity v. no pretrial publicity) ANCOVA. Juror Bias Scale
scores were covaried in light of their correlation with predeliberation
verdict and in view of the possibility that subjects in the four
conditions differed with respect to scores on that scale.
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C. Predeliberation Effects.
The adjusted cell means are plotted in Figure 1.
Insert Figure 1 about here
As predicted, the main effect for pretrial publicity was
significant, F (1, 61) = 4.40, p = .040, eta-squared = .06. Subjects
exposed to pretrial publicity were more likely to convict as compared
with subjects exposed to no pretrial publicity. The main effect for
voir dire was also significant, F (1, 61) = 8.61, p = .005, eta-squared
= .12, meaning that the attorney-extended voir dire elicited fewer
convictions than did the judge-federal voir dire. The interaction did
not approach statistical significance, F (1, 61) = .22, p = .64, eta-
squared = .002, indicating that the effect of pretrial publicity was
comparable in magnitude across the two voir dire conditions. In
summary, pretrial publicity increased conviction rate and attorney-
extended voir dire decreased conviction rate, but the attorney-extended
voir dire failed to reduce the prejudicial effect of pretrial publicity.
Similar patterns of results emerge using the case strength ratings and a
scaled verdict (i.e., verdict combined with verdict confidence scores)
as dependent variables as well as by covarying out for Juror Bias
subscale scores.
Additional evidence for the prejudicial effect of pretrial
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publicity is evident in the analyses of the defendant culpability
ratings obtained immediately after subjects read the publicity packets.
Among the subjects exposed to pretrial publicity (n = 38), perceived
culpability of the defendant, rated just after reading the publicity,
correlated .36 (p = .027) with predeliberation verdicts. Subjects who
perceived the defendant to be more culpable--based on the publicity--
were more likely to convict him. When the effect of Juror Bias Scale
scores was removed, the correlation between culpability ratings
(obtained immediately after reading the pretrail publicity) and
predeliberation verdict dropped to .22 (p = .166). While these findings
suggest that exposure to prejudicial pretrial publicity increased
perceptions of guilt, one might argue alternatively that the correlation
between culpability ratings and predeliberation verdict reflects instead
subjects' commitment to their initial verdict choice.
D. Postdeliberation Effects.
Although I conducted inferential analyses on
postdeliberation verdict, these analyses must be viewed with caution.
These data violate the independence assumption. ANCOVA was used to
examine the influence of PTP on voir dire as reflected in
postdeliberation verdicts. Juror Bias Scale scores served as the
covariate. Significant main effects were found for PTP, F (1, 64)
9.12, p = .004, eta-squared = .119, and for voir dire, F (1, 64) = 4.08,
= .04, eta-squared = .053. The main effect for deliberation,
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however, was nonsignificant, F (1, 63) = .78, p = .382, eta-squared =
.01. The voir dire X PTP interaction was also significant, F (1, 64) =
4.32, p = .042, eta-squared = .056. The cell means (adjusted for JBS
scores) are plotted in Figure 2. The interaction shows that the effect
for PTP is significantly greater within the attorney-extended condition
than within the judge-federal condition.
Does deliberation affect subjects' judgments? In order to
directly address this question, a three-way mixed design MANOVA was
conducted with two between-subject variables, PTP and voir dire, and one
within=subject variable, deliberation (pre v. post). The dependent
variable was verdict. This analysis examines whether deliberation
qualifies any of the above effects. The deliberation X PTP interaction
was nonsignificant, F ( 1, 63) = .71, p = .402, eta-squared = .01,
indicating that the magnitude of the PTP effect was unchanged by
deliberation. Likewise, the deliberation X voir dire interaction was
nonsignificant, F (1, 63) = .71 , p = .402, eta-squared = .01,
indicating that the magnitude of the voir dire effect was not qualified
by deliberation. The three-way interaction, however, was significant, F
(1, 63) = 6.59, p = .013, eta-squared = .09, indicating that the two-way
interaction between voir dire and PTP was significantly larger after
rather than before deliberation (cf. Figures 1 and 2). As the
univariate ANCOVAs showed, the PTP X voir dire interaction was
nonsignificant for predeliberation verdicts but significant for
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postdeliberation verdicts. Again, analyses involving postdeliberation
verdict must be viewed with caution, as the data are not independent.
Finally, subjects in each of the four experimental
conditions were randomly assigned to one of two juries yielding a total
of eight deliberating juries. Juries in (a) judge-federal voir dire/no
PTP voted not guilty, hung; (b) attorney-extended voir dire/no PTP voted
not guilty, not guilty; (c) judge-federal voir dire/PTP voted hung, not
guilty; and (d) attorney-extended voir dire/PTP voted guilty, not
guilty. Because these grouped data do not constitute a large enough
sample, they were not subjected to statistical analysis.
IV. Discussion
A. Major Findings
The present study asked two important questions: Does
prejudicial pretrial publicity produce bias which may impair juror
objectivity and, if it does, can voir dire remedy its untoward effects.
In terms, then, of its two-fold thrust, the present study found, first
of all, that subjects exposed to prejudicial pretrial publicity are more
likely to convict than those who read neutral stories. I found,
secondly, that prejudgment of a general nature (e.g., confusion about
legal concepts) may be neutralized by an extended, attorney-conducted
voir dire, but that prejudice specifically created by exposure to
inflammatory news stories is not offset by an extended voir dire format.
While these results suggest that insights made available
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during the attorney-extended voir dire caused jurors to hold the State
more stringently to its burden of proof, without independent evidence, I
cannot be sure. Subjects were not asked directly to recall or to
weight the information received during voir dire. However, because
substantive content (i.e., clarifying misunderstood legal concepts)
constitutes the biggest difference between the judge-federal and
attorney-extended voir dire, I inferred that insights provided by the
attorney account for the differences in predeliberation verdicts.
One could alternatively argue that, because in the extended
voir dire the attorney attempted to establish rapport, subjects
acquitted simply because they liked the attorney. Whether the decision
to acquit was the result of subjects holding the State more stringently
to its burden or the result of rapport established between the attorney
and subjects, the point to be made is that procedural change (i.e.,
extended, attorney-conducted voir dire) benefitted defense counsel's
client. Given the position taken here, namely that trial adversaries
are obliged to do whatever they legally can to protect their client's
interests, these findings support the contention that justice has been
served.
1. The remedial effect of deliberation on
prejudice created by media. Questioned also was the
potential remedial effect of jury deliberation on prejudice created by
incriminating news stories. If, as the court assumes, the deliberation
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process safeguards defendants against the damaging effects of
prejudicial publicity then I should have found a smaller pretrial
publicity effect for post- versus pre-deliberation verdict. This,
however, was not the case. I found, as did earlier research, that the
effect for pretrial publicity was greater for postdeliberation than it
was for predeliberation verdicts, meaning that deliberation exaggerated
media effects. That this exaggerated PTP effect in postdeliberation
verdicts was significantly greater among subjects in the attorney-
extended, as compared with the judge-federal, voir dire condition is
more difficult to explain.
As an ad hoc explanation for this unpredicted finding, the
classic polarization effect is certainly one possibility (Burnstein &
Vinokur, 1975, 1977). Having either read or not read prejudicial news
stories, subjects had already formed or had not formed opinions
regarding the defendant's culpability. Group polarization theory
predicts that group debate (i.e., deliberation in this case) will
strengthen and thereby polarize subjects' originally held opinions.
This means that subjects for whom the publicity created impressions of
guilt and subjects for whom no such prejudgments have been formed, will
assert their opinions more confidently after debate. Why, however, is
there no evidence of polarization in the judge-federal voir dire?
Again, group polarization is the result of strengthening one's
previously held position on some issue. Irrespective of voir dire
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condition, subjects either had or had not been exposed to prejudicial
pretrial publicity. However, unlike subjects in the attorney-extended
voir dire, subjects in the judge-federal condition did not benefit from
the attorney's attempts to clarify confusing legalities during voir
dire. There is a sense in which the clearing up of commonly
misunderstood legal concepts functioned to inoculate (McGuire, 1961,
1964) subjects, who did not read publicity, against persuasion attempts
made by those who had and who believed, even before the trial, that the
defendant was guilty. Subjects, in the judge-federal voir dire, who
were not exposed to publicity probably had no opinion as to the
defendant's guilt. Without benefit either of inoculation, subjects voir
dired by the judge who had not read prejudicial publicity were unable,
during deliberation, to resist persuasive arguments made by subjects who
had read and who believed, based on the media coverage, that the
defendant was guilty.
Hastie, Penrod, and Pennington (1983), also interested in
why people change their minds during deliberation, discuss similar
findings in terms of knowledgeability, confidence, and susceptibility to
social influence as documented in classic social psychological studies
of conformity and persuasion (e.g., Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Sherif,
1935). Hastie et al. (1983) found that jurors were more influenced by
information about legal issues (e.g., presumption of innocence and
standard of proof) than by information about the trial evidence,
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because, they reasoned, jurors are generally confident that they
understand what happened during the crime event (we draw conclusions
about causes of events all the time) but are less so about applications
of law. Lacking such relevant information, jurors can be coerced into
agreement by those whose beliefs are confidently expressed as was the
case with subjects (in the present study) who had read prejudicial
publicity (Sherif, 1935).
2. Problems with dichotomous variables. There are some who
take issue with use of a dichotomous dependent variable arguing that,
because it restricts variability, the variable is less sensitive (Penrod
& Cutler, 1987). Still others point out that a juror's task, in the
real world, is to make a dichotomous decision and that to alter it for
experimental purposes is inappropriate (Carroll et al., 1986).
Attempting to assuage critics on either side of this issue, subjects
rendered dichotomous verdict decisions and expressed confidence (on 9-
point scales) in their decision. Combining the two sources of
independent information, I produced a scaled-predeliberation verdict
measure which, as it turns out, supported my original (unscaled)
findings.
3. Does voir dire neutralize expectancy confirmation.
In their recent review, Pennington and Hastie (1990)
contrast the earlier algebraic adjustment process accounts and the new,
cognitive, explanation-based accounts of jury decision making. Integral
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to the explanation-based approach is the recognition that trial evidence
is evaluated in terms of jurors' world views. As stated, the main effect
for voir dire suggests that partiality of a general nature can be offset
by a probing and informative voir dire. Jurors, regardless of which
media they read in advance, convicted less in the attorney-extended
conditions meaning that what they heard during voir dire served to
clarify previously held misconceptions. By explaining what is meant and
how generally to apply legal concepts such as presumption of innocence,
burden of proof, and reasonable doubt in particular, the extended voir
dire facilitated juror impartiality. Now jurors were able to
objectively evaluate trial testimony and carefully apply the law as
instructed by the trial judge.
Resisting neutralization, however, the specific expectancy
created by prejudicial pretrial publicity was not offset by voir dire.
The main effect for pretrial publicity was not qualified by voir dire
meaning that prejudicial impressions created by inflammatory news
stories persisted even after subjects were told that facts reported in
the media are not evidence. As suggested in the expectancy confirmation
literature (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979; Darley & Fazio, 1980), subjects'
ability to weigh the case facts objectively was influenced by
prejudicial media coverage. These findings are not meant to be
discouraging. The fact is that extended voir dire did affect certain
juror behaviors. Perhaps the oral examination simply was not thorough
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enough. There is, then, reason to believe that with more time spent
explaining case facts and with greater attention to individual jurors,
voir dire could eliminate even the specific prejudice created by
pretrial publicity.
B. Policy Implications
1. Comparisons between jud-minimal an
attorney-extended voir ire. In principle, voir dire
safeguards a criminal defendant's right to trial by an impartial jury
but, in reality, juror questioning in the minimalist federal model may
be so constrained that disclosure of juror prejudice is impossible
(Moran, Cutler, & Loftus, 1990). Without sufficient probing, jurors
will not be disqualified either for cause or peremptorily meaning that
verdicts may be influenced by undetected juror bias. Fundamentally,
this constitutes a miscarriage of justice. Nowhere, in the law, is the
breadth and depth of voir dire questioning specified, but if fairness is
what the law demands then voir dire must probe deeply enough to
disqualify jurors, if not for cause, then peremptorily. In fact, the
courts acknowledge that the peremptory challenge is "one of the most
important of the rights secured to the accused [and] a necessary part of
trial by jury" (Swain v. Alabama, 1965, p. xxx). To use peremptory
challenges wisely, attorneys need sufficient latitude to probe into the
background and attitudes of venirepersons (United States v. elliner,
1972). If it can be shown that information gleaned from extended voir
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dire enables attorneys to maximize the use of their challenges, then
perhaps judges will be persuaded to allow extended voir dire.
Jury researchers have found support for use of the expanded,
attorney-conducted voir dire at least insofar as challenge for cause is
concerned. For example, when compared with a restricted (judge-
conducted, en masse) voir dire, the expanded (attorney-conducted,
sequestered) version, in one third of all capital trials between 1975-
1980 in Kentucky, yielded more challenges for cause by the defense
(Nietzel & Dillehay, 1982). And based on statistical evidence from a
number of trials, Christie (1976) suggests that when voir dire
questioning is not adequately developed, attorneys cannot successfully
challenge jurors for cause.
Differences between the minimal (judge-conducted) and
extended voir dire (attorney-conducted) formats are glaring in terms of
both the quality, quantity, and relevance of questions asked, and, as
already suggested, the minimal voir dire yields little information from
each juror on which to base peremptory challenges (Moran, Cutler, &
Loftus, 1990). Typically, questioning in a minimal voir dire is limited
to demographics such as age; place of residence; occupation; marital
status; spouse's occupation; children's ages and occupations; and
membership in social groups. Judges usually conclude questioning with a
presentation of certain case facts after which jurors are asked if they
can render impartial judgments. Few say they cannot. Rather than
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disqualifying for cause those who do, the judge "rehabilitates" them;
that is, jurors who indicated inability to be fair are pressured into
believing that they can be. Although there is some evidence that
information learned during a minimal voir dire can predict conviction-
proneness, predictive validity is modest (Moran & Comfort, 1982; Moran &
Cutler, 1989). Compared with basic demographic information, personality
attributes; attitudes; authoritarian tendencies; case-relevant opinions
and experiences; attitudes toward crime; and political views are better
predictors of tendency to convict (Moran & Cutler, 1989; Moran, Cutler,
& Loftus, 1990). Such information is often made available during
extended voir dire.
2. Proposed legislative changes in voir dire. Results of
this study are relevant to issues recently under senatorial debate.
Early in 1983, Senator Howell Heflin of Alabama introduced Senate Bills
386 and 677 which proposed amendments to Federal Rules of Procedure
24(a) and 47(a), respectively. Both bills sought to change the conduct
of voir dire in federal district courts. As it stands, trial judges
control the nature and extent of voir dire questioning; they also decide
who asks the questions. A 1977 survey of federal judges revealed that
75% do not permit lawyers to conduct oral examination (Bermant, 1977).
In the aforementioned two bills, lawyers argued the right to oral
participation in jury selection on the grounds that without it they
cannot make intelligent use of peremptory challenges. Their rationale
52
is simple: unless defense counsel is allowed to probe and disqualify the
venire for prejudice which may be obvious or subtle, they cannot
adequately protect their client's Sixth Amendment right. Any
infringement of this right constitutes reversible error without the need
to show prejudice (United States v. Blanton, 1978). Neither of the
bills passed.
3. Bermant's argument. That criminal defendants are
entitled to trial by a fair jury is not the issue here--it is an
inalienable right--the issue is whether or not extended, attorney-
conducted voir dire makes trial by a fair jury more likely. Expressing
his concern, Bermant vigorously justifies continued control of voir dire
by trial judges. Handing control of jury selection over to trial
lawyers would not make a fair trial more likely but would, according to
Bermant, make the justice system itself vulnerable to the sort of
attorney abuses that are inherent in adversarial advocacy. The threat
to "fairness" comes not from undetected juror prejudice, Bermant goes on
to say, but comes from overzealous adversaries who are paid to win at
all costs. The values that are at odds in the voir dire issue, then,
are the value of a fair jury versus the value of adversary advocacy. It
is interesting that here Bermant characterizes fairness and advocacy as
opposing values when earlier he discusses them not as competing values
but as alternative threats. The present study's findings have direct
bearing on this issue and since Bermant argues several of its relevant
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aspects, I will state and attempt to rebut his position point by point.
Case law clearly states that, regardless of who does the
asking, the oral examination "must be thorough enough to allow the
intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges by trial counsel"
(Bermant, 1977, p. 298). Not surprisingly, Bermant questions what is
meant by "intelligent exercise." As is often the case in law, its
utterly abstract language defies understanding. What Bermant soon makes
clear is that, for him, the real issue is not whether attorneys acquire
enough useful information during voir dire to protect their clients'
rights, but whether they are skilled enough, given exhaustive
information, to ferret out deep-seated prejudice in jury panelists.
There is no evidence, claims Bermant, to suggest that attorneys can
intuit who, from among the venire, may or may not be favorably disposed
toward their client.
One often cited study--and there are only a few--that
directly examined these issues found that lawyers did not effectively
use voir dire to disqualify biased jurors (Zeisel & Diamond, 1978).
Zeisel and Diamond (1978) employed shadow juries composed of
peremptorily challenged jurors from the actual panel or randomly
selected jurors, who watched complete trials along with the actual
juries. In only three of the twelve trials for which data were
collected did attorney challenges favorably influence jury composition
(but the judges in these cases did not support the juries' verdicts).
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Zeisel and Diamond concluded that attorney performance was highly
variable and that, across trials, attorneys sat as many unfavorable
jurors as they excused. There were methodological problems as well, for
example, data had to be reconstructed making generalization to everyday
legal practice imprudent.
Bermant points out, as he reasonably should, some reasons
why Zeisel and Diamond's (1978) discouraging conclusions should not be
taken as the final word. First, and this bears significantly on the
problem, the lawyers in Zeisel and Diamond's study were excluded from
participation in the voir dire procedure. If the issue is whether or
not lawyers can make good use of personally conducted juror interviews,
but they are denied the interviews, how can inferences regarding lawyer
efficacy be made from Zeisel and Diamond's findings? Bermant is careful
to point out at least some of this but then goes on to say:
Nevertheless, this research remains the strongest available
and a model for those who would seriously try to promote
change in the current federal practice by bringing positive
evidence to bear in favor of their position (p. 299).
In my opinion, Bermant is making an unjustifiably strong
case given that "there is only a beginning of empirical research on the
skills of lawyers to utilize the examination effectively" (p. 299) and
that the research he cites does not fairly test the issue at hand. We
cannot rule out the possibility, and this is the second reason why much
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to-do over Zeisel and Diamond's findings is unwarranted, that given a
fair test attorneys might indeed prove to be effective. Using this same
reasoning, one cannot rule out the possibility that, if assisted by
scientific jury selection, attorneys may well utilize voir dire
effectively (Moran, Cutler, & Loftus, 1990).
4. Statements made by the proponents of change. As a way
of stating his case, Bermant reproduces testimony that was given by John
Ackerman before the Senate Judiciary Committee in support of the
proposed rule changes. As past president of the NACDL and testifying on
its behalf, Ackerman cited Broeder's (1965) data which showed that
jurors, during the voir dire examination, were not entirely forthright
in their responses. Agreeing that juror dishonesty--to the degree that
it exists--poses a serious problem, Bermant asks and answers three
relevant questions. First, does public examination in a court of law
inhibit juror honesty? Second, does the role or status of the examiner
influence juror responses? And, third, does skillful questioning make
juror honesty more likely irrespective of role?
Bermant says no one knows whether judges or lawyers inhibit
jurors more and even if it were the case that judges do inhibit juror
honesty the problem will not be solved by shifting control of voir dire
to lawyers, but by training judges to conduct good interviews. My
response to these claims is mixed. Subsequent research by Jones (1987),
found that subjects (who were interviewed by either a judge or an
56
attorney) changed their answers nearly twice as much when questioned by
a judge. These findings speak, at the same time, to the first and last
of Bermant's three questions; that is, yes, judges may inhibit frank
juror disclosure and, no, the skill of the interviewer, irrespective of
role or personal style, does not make the important difference. In
Jones's study (1987), the content and length of the voir dire was
identical for both the judge and attorney. Even if, as Bermant
recommends, judges were trained to elicit probative information from
jurors making trial by a fair jury more likely, the "key ingredient," as
he puts it, "will be the judge's willingness to pursue improved voir
dire methods" (p. 304). In terms of policy, consideration of this
change, at the very least, is what I would hope my findings ultimately
inspire.
Referring to what Bermant calls the "most significant and
serious argument" (p. 304) among those offered in Ackerman's testimony,
is the claim that trial judges do not know how to ask questions. The
point being of course, that without sufficient probative information,
attorneys cannot intelligently exercise peremptory challenges. Here the
argument returns to Bermant's initial challenge; that is, can attorneys
do any better and, if they could would a "fair" jury be the net result?
On both counts, Bermant thinks not. With tongue in cheek, Bermant
ridicules an unfounded social psychological claim that judges, unlike
lawyers, do not know enough about the psychological subtleties of the
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cases at bar to ask meaningful questions (e.g., it States v. be,
1980). Granting that certain politically or ideologically charged
criminal cases, where the evidence is thin, may require a sensitive and
skilled probe for juror prejudice, Bermant disagrees that routine cases
require such a probe or that attorneys can or should be the persons to
conduct it. Bermant insists that claims made by those who advocate
changing the conduct of voir dire are specious, once again, on the
grounds that they are unsupported by empirical data. But
there are two sides to this claim; absent empirical evidence, one may
not conclude that lawyers can or cannot conduct more productive
interviews. Despite failure to find empirical support, attorneys
maintain that intuition and experience help them to identify and
challenge unfavorable jury panelists. Why does this confidence persist
if in fact attorney selection methods are unsuccessful? Because
attorneys do not get relevant feedback (i.e., they never really know if
they challenged the right individuals) they may attribute a favorable
verdict to their selection strategy when in reality the desired verdict
may be the result of (a) weak evidence on the opposing side and/or (b) a
well-presented case.
5. Statements made by the opponents of change The
position of those who oppose change centers on questions of time and
abuse. While Ackerman, speaking for trial lawyers, claimed that
attorney-conducted voir dire takes approximately 10% of total trial
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time, Trott (citing from New York Governor Hugh Carey's Executive
Advisory Commission on the Administration of Justice) reported that voir
dire under the control of attorneys can take as much as one third of
total trial time. In a justice system whose calendars are already
severely backlogged, it is difficult to justify additional time expense
especially when, left to their own devices, lawyers "will abuse the
examination, the panel members, and the patience of the public who also
await their days in court" (p. 315). In short, then, concerns expressed
by the Judicial Conference of the United States, are over the
distinction between probative and didactic use of the voir dire
examination. In their opinion, trial lawyers, if given control of voir
dire, will use it for didactic purposes and while criminal defendants
are protected under the Sixth Amendment, there is no safeguard against
illegal use of voir dire.
Despite the fact that there is no empirical evidence to
support these claims, Bermant confidently asserts that good advocates
simply could not help but misbehave. For if done effectively, lawyers
can select juries that are sympathetic to their clients but, in so
doing, move from an impartial jury to a partial one. Posing a grave
threat to the justice system, then, are defense counsels who strive to
do whatever will achieve victory for their clients. Countering this
claim, Ackerman wonders:
Why is it that judges who do such a marvelous job of
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controlling improper questions of witnesses, improper
opening statements and improper argument, cannot control
improper voir dire (p. 307)?
As for the issue of time itself, Ackerman asks if time saved on voir
dire is worth the sacrifice; with the extra time, a defendant may get a
fair and impartial jury. Actually, the solution may be simple. In
fact, a prime argument made by trial consultants in favor of extended
voir dire, is that by using voir dire questionnaires, the duration of
the jury selection can be shortened.
Finally, and this is the official position of the Department
of Justice, that "the prevailing practice [most federal judges conduct
the examinations entirely themselves] has proven to be fair and
economical" (p. 310). Might one logically respond to this statement
just as Bermant responds to statements made by those who oppose his
views, namely by asking where the evidence is. Saks (1989), in his
analysis and evaluation of legal policy, points out the law's tendency
to make and change policy without benefit of data. Using examples such
as insanity defense reform, legislation to solve the liability crisis,
and sentencing guidelines, Saks suggests that, in making decisions that
affect our everyday lives, the law (including lawyers, judges, and
legislators) does not know what information is relevant, where to find
it, or how to evaluate it. The thrust of Bermant's position seems to be
founded on the same shaky ground.
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While Bermant seems confident that his argument is a strong
one, I find it unsatisfying. Much of what he dismisses as either
already known or else unprovable constitutes prime fodder for empirical
examination. There are three things that we know already. First, Jones
did find that attorneys, as compared with judges, elicited more candid
juror disclosure. Second, extended (versus minimal) voir dire produced
more probative information from which to base intelligent peremptory
challenges (Moran, Cutler, & Loftus, 1990). And third, attorney-
extended (versus judge-federal) voir dire neutralized the effects of
general preconceptions on juror verdicts.
C. Suggestions for Further Research
Convinced that only judges can guarantee the integrity of
the voir dire examination, Bermant recommends leaving the current
federal rules as they are. I, on the other hand, am optimistic that
voir dire, insofar as it insures impartiality, can be improved. These
findings invite investigation along two separate and important lines of
inquiry. First, can the form and substance of the oral examination
itself, irrespective of the interviewer, favorably influence jury
composition? And second, given that the interview effectively 
flushes
out juror prejudice, will it be used more productively by the lawyer,
the judge, or via venireperson questionnaire?
The present study found that attorney-extended voir dire
affected prejudice of a general nature but not prejudice specifically
61
created by pretrial publicity. These results call for an even more
expanded juror interview. By exposing the ways in which incriminating
media create prejudice, voir dire could undermine its untoward effects.
The first leg of the proposed research, then, should again pit a
minimalist voir dire against a more expanded version. Whereas the
present study limited counsel's voir dire to one hour, in the next study
defense counsel will question individual jury panelists at length either
en masse or sequestered. It will be interesting to see whether the
public or the private forum produces the fairer juror. Social
psychologists hold that public commitments to objectivity make jurors
more accountable to each other. On the other hand, it is easy to
imagine that disclosures of prejudice would be inhibited by the presence
of others. Besides commitments to uphold the law and public disclosures
of juror bias, the expanded voir dire should increase the volume of
usable information for exercising peremptory challenges.
Having constructed the optimal juror interview and tested
its effectiveness, the second leg of the proposed research will
determine whether its use is maximized by the judge or by the lawyer.
With this second test, two of Bermant's original three questions can be
addressed, namely is the "elicitation of honest answers affected by the
role of questioner and is the extent to which the elicitation of candid
answers affected by the interviewing skill of the questioner,
irrespective of role" (p. 304). Answers to these questions should put
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some of the conjecture to rest and, more importantly, this research
should quiet the cry for empirical findings that appears throughout the
psycholegal literature--not to mention Bermant's argument. Finally,
should we demonstrate that extended voir dire--conducted by whomever--is
more likely to safeguard a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights then
judges, in the service of justice, may be persuaded to permit its use in
their courts.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Intercorrel ations
M SD 2 3 4 5 6 7
1) Juror Bias Scale 65.55 11.85 .84 .87 -. 14 -. 24 .13 -. 09
2) Prob of Commission 30.13 6.70 .47 -. 28 -. 34 .22 -. 25
3) Reasonable Doubt 35.56 7.18 .00 -. 05 .04 .07
4) Pre- Verdict .41 .50 .65 -. 70 .78
5) Strength Defense 5.43 2.13 -. 54 .41
6) Strength Prosecution 5.04 2.33 -. 57
7) Post- Verdict .61 .49
Table 2
Predeliberation Verdict
VD PTP Constant VD PTP Acquit Convict
-1 -1 .59 -. 17 .12 = .54 .46
-1 1 .59 -. 17 -. 12 = .30 .70
1 -1 .59 .17 .12 = .88 .12
1 1 .59 .17 -. 12 = .64 .36
VD: Judge-federal = -1
Attorney-extended = 1
PTP: No = -1
Yes = 1
Table 3
Postdeliberation Verdict
VD PIP Constant VD PTP VP Acquit Convict
-1 -1 .64 -. 13 .17 -. 12 .56 .44
-1 1 .64 -. 13 -. 17 .12 .46 .54
1 -1 .64 .13 .17 .12 1.00 .00
1 1 .64 .13 -. 17 -. 12 .48 .52
Ley
VD: Judge-federal = -1
Attorney-extended = 1
PTP: No = -1
Yes = 1
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APPENDIX A
Demographics and Juror Bias Scale
Name:________________ Student ID #:
Professor: __________ Phone Number:
Please answer each question to the best of your ability. You must not
ask anyone for help.
We are sure that you understand the importance of juries to our American
system of justice. We are confident that you also appreciate your duty
as a citizen to serve as a juror if you are eligible. Your cooperation in
completing and returning this "Juror Questionnaire" is a part of that
duty. Without your help our courts cannot operate properly in accordance
with the United States Constitution.
PLEASE PUT YOUR NAME AND SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER ON THE RESPONSE SHEET AND
FILL IN THE CORRESPONDING BUBBLES. THE FIRST PART OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE
SOLICITS DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION. PLEASE INDICATE ALL ANSWERS ON THE
RESPONSE SHEET PROVIDED FOR YOU. MAKE SURE YOU ANSWER EVERY QUESTION.
Please answer the following demographic questions.
1. Your Sex: A) Male ___ B) Female
2. Your Age: A) 17-29 ___ B) 30-39
C) 40-49 D) 50-59
E) 60+
3. Your Race: A) White B) Black
C) Hispanic D) Other (specify)
4. Please indicate your marital status.
A) Never married
B) Divorced (currently single)
C) Divorced (currently remarried)
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D) Married (never divorced) _______
E) Widowed _____
5. How many children do you have?
A) None
B) One or Two
C) Three
D) More than three _
6. What is your educational level?
A) Post-graduate college work or degree
B) College degree
C) Some college but didn't complete program
D) High School graduate
E) Less than high school graduate
7. What is your current political preference (not
necessarily your registration)?
A) Democrat
B) Republican
C) Independent
D) Other (specify)
8. Aside from your political affiliation, how would you
evaluate your political views?
A) Liberal
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B) Slightly Liberal 
_
C) Slightly conservative 
_
D) Conservative
9. Have you ever served on a jury in a criminal case?
A) Yes
B) No
10. Have you ever served on a jury in a civil case?
A) Yes
B) No
11. Are you a registered voter?
A) Yes
B) No _
The following is a list of personal opinions that are descriptive of some
people, less descriptive of others. There are no right or wrong answers.
The answer that best describes you or your opinion is the right answer.
It is usually best to answer the questions rather quickly rather than
spending a long time thinking about them. Some answers may be hard to
decide upon. Please give your best personal response even if you are
somewhat unsure. IT IS IMPORTANT TO ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS.
12. If a suspect runs from the police, then he probably
committed the crime.
strongly strongly
agree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 disagree
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13. A defendant should be found guilty if 11 out of 12
jurors vote guilty.
strongly strongly
agree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 disagree
14. Too often jurors hesitate to convict someone who is
guilty out of pure sympathy.
strongly strongly
agree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 disagree
15. In most cases where the accused presents a strong
defense, it is only because of a good lawyer.
strongly strongly
agree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 disagree
16. The death penalty is cruel and inhumane.
strongly strongly
agree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 disagree
17. Out of every 100 people brought to trial, at least 75
are guilty of the crime with which they are charged.
strongly strongly
agree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 disagree
18. For serious crimes like murder, a defendant should be
found guilty so long as there is a 90% chance that he
committed the crime.
strongly strongly
agree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 disagree
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19. Defense lawyers don't really care about guilt or
innocence, they are just in business to make money.
strongly strongly
agree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 disagree
20. Generally, the police make an arrest only when they are
sure about who committed the crime.
strongly strongly
agree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 disagree
21. Circumstantial evidence is too weak to use in court.
strongly strongly
agree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 disagree
22. Many accident claims filed against insurance companies
are phony.
strongly strongly
agree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 disagree
23. The defendant is often a victim of his own bad
reputation.
strongly strongly
agree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 disagree
24. If the grand jury recommends that a person be brought
to trial, then he probably committed the crime.
strongly strongly
agree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 disagree
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25. Extenuating circumstances should not be considered--if
a person commits a crime, then that person should be
punished.
strongly strongly
agree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 disagree
26. Too many innocent people are wrongfully imprisoned.
strongly strongly
agree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 disagree
27. If a majority of the evidence--but not all of
it--suggests that the defendant committed the crime,
the jury should vote not guilty.
strongly strongly
agree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 disagree
28. If the defendant committed a victimless crime like
gambling or possession of marijuana, he should never be
convicted.
strongly strongly
agree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 disagree
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APPENDIX B
Pre- and Postdeliberation Scale
Name: I.D. #
Prof: 
__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Please respond to the following questions as if you were called to jury
duty in this case. Indicate your responses by either circling the
appropriate answer or by entering your answer in the space provided.
1. Right now, if I were to ask you to state your verdict,
what verdict would it be? (circle one)
GUILTY NOT GUILTY
2. How confident are you that your verdict is correct?
not at all extremely
confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 confident
3. How would you rate the overall strength of the Defense's
case offered at trial?
very weak 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 very strong
4. How would you rate the overall strength of the
Prosecution's case offered at trial?
very weak 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 very strong
5. How persuasive was David Jones as a witness?
not at all extremely
persuasive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 persuasive
6. How persuasive was Sally Roberts Smith as a witness?
not at all extremely
persuasive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 persuasive
7. How persuasive was Officer Overby as a witness for the
Prosecution?
not at all extremely
persuasive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 persuasive
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8. How persuasive was the pathologist Helen Young as a
witness for the Defense?
not at all extremely
persuasive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 persuasive
9. How would you rate the overall ability of the lawyer for
the Prosecution?
not very able 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 very able
10. How would you rate the overall ability of the lawyer
for the Defense?
not very able 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 veryable
11. How strong was your interest in this case?
not at all extremely
interested 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 interested
12. How strong was your involvement in this case?
not at all extremely
involved 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 involved
13. How strong was your commitment to seek the truth (i.e.,
weigh only the evidence presented at trial) in this
case?
not at all extremely
committed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 committed
14. To what extent did the judge's instructions help you
reach a verdict?
not at all extremely
helpful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 helpful
15. How well did you understand the judge's instructions to
the jury?
Could not Easy to
understand 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 understand
STOP: DO NOT GO ANY FURTHER AT THIS TIME
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Name: I.D #: Prof-
Prof : ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
16. What was your initial (personal) decision in the case
after deliberation? (circle one)
GUILTY NOT GUILTY
17. What was the jury's final decision in the case? (circle
one)
GUILTY NOT GUILTY
18. Were you the foreman in this case? (circle one)
YES NO
19. To what extent were you personally responsible for
changing other jurors' decisions?
not at all extremely
responsible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 responsible
20. To what degree did you believe that it was better to
reach some decision, even if you were unsure of the
right decision?
Not at all Completely
better 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 better
21. Were you, and are you now satisfied with the decision
reached by the jury?
not at all extremely
satisfied 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 satisfied
22. How influential were you personally in making the
verdict decision?
not at all extremely
influential 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 influential
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APPENDIX C
Case-Specific Pretrial Publicity
THE MILWAUKEE JOURNAL
WISCONSIN'S LARGEST NEWSPAPER MILWAUKEE, MARCH 24, 1981
DRUG DEALER FOUND DEAD
by Dave Droege
Staff Writer
A Milwaukee man was found dead
March 23, 1981. He was shot in the face by
a .22 caliber gun.
Dead is Fred Johnson 1229 North
21st Street. He was killed at the
residence of Sally Roberts, 5042 North 21st
Street city of Milwaukee.
Milwaukee police have charged
Frank Smith, 28, 3412 North Seventh
Street., first degree murder. He is being
held in Milwaukee County Jail on 20,000
bond.
Police went to Roberts' house
sometime in the evening hours after being
called by Sally Roberts' mother. Johnson
was dead at the scene. He was found lying
in the alley behind Roberts' apartment with
a bullet wound to the face said Officer
Overby.
Smith was arrested after
Johnson's body was found. Overby did not
say what linked Smith with the shooting.
Neighbors said they'd seen him "hanging
around" with known drug dealers. Smith had
been convicted of heroine possession last
year. Officers are still looking for
witnesses Overby said.
Milwaukee County Coroner,
Robert Huntington, has ruled the death
homicide. Huntington said Johnson died as
a result of being shot in the face with a
.22 caliber gun.
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A formal autopsy is being made
today Huntington said. He added that the
shot struck Johnson in the right side of
the face near the nose and traveled through
the head ending up at the left brain.
Earlier that day police
dispatch received an anonymous tipoff that
a drug "deal" might take place.
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MURDER SUSPECT AMONG 10 SUSPECTED
OF DRUG TRAFFICKING
by Dave Droege
Staff Writer
The Milwaukee Grand Jury
has indicted Frank Smith for
aggravated murder in connection
with the March 23, 1981
shooting of a 27 year old city
man.
The Grand Jury issued
indictments during a 2-day
session that ended Tuesday
morning.
The indictments are
formal charges and do not imply
guilt, but the District
Attorney's Office says they're
confident of getting a
conviction. Smith, 28, 3412
North Seventh Street, is
charged with the shooting and
killing of Fred Johnson.
Johnson was killed at the home
of Sally Roberts, 5042 North
21st Street. A bloody path led
officers to the body located in
the alley behind Roberts'
apartment. Probable cause of
death was a gunshot wound to
the face.
Police arrested Smith
later that day. The gun used
to fire the shot was never
found. According to police,
Smith's story is weak. Because
of Smith's prior drug-related
arrests and his known
associations with drug
traffickers, the police are
confident that the aggravated
murder charge will be easy to
prove.
7
FIRST DEGREE MURDER CHARGE
GOES TO TRIAL ON JAN. 6
by Dave Droege
Staff Writer
The man charged with
using a gun to kill Fred
Johnson will go on trial in
early January in Milwaukee
County in Common Pleas Court.
Frank Smith, 28, 3412
North Seventh Street,
Milwaukee, was found competent
to stand trial during a hearing
Friday morning in Common Pleas
Court.
Smith's trial on a first
degree murder charge will start
Jan. 6, 1982. Milwaukee police
charged Smith after Johnson was
slain during the evening hours
on March 23, 1981. Johnson was
shot in the head by a .22
bullet while sitting in the
living room of Sally Roberts'
apartment, 5042 North 21st
Street, Milwaukee. Johnson was
found dead in the alley behind
the Roberts' residence.
Smith, who confessed and
then retracted his confession
just after arrest, has entered
pleas of not guilty. He is
being held on $100,000 bond.
During last Friday's
hearing the Milwaukee
Prosecutor's Office presented
psychiatric reports from the
Milwaukee State Hospital for
the Criminally Insane and the
Madison Diagnostic Center.
Smith's attorney, William
Coffee, presented reports for
Dr. Robert Mahrer and Dr.
Ricardo Girona. Deehre's
decision was based on the
reports.
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All of the reports can be
submitted as evidence in the
case, a spokesman for the
prosecutor's office said.
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COUNTRY'S FIRST VIDEOTAPED
CRIMINAL TRIAL PLANNED
by Dave Droege
Staff Writer
The jury trial of a
Milwaukee man accused of
shooting another man to death
will be the first videotaped
criminal trial conducted in
Milwaukee County.
Jurors will hear
videotaped testimony from tapes
prepared before the trial,
which is tentatively expected
to start Jan. 6.
In an effort to piece
together the evidence, the
Prosecutor's Office solicited
the statements of Sally
Roberts, the scene of the
shooting, and David Jones, an
eyewitness to the slaying.
According to the District
Attorney, McCann, Roberts told
her mother that: "Alice and I
were in the kitchen when I
heard a shot. I ran into the
living room and saw a man lying
on the couch and he was
bleeding. Frank was standing
there. I think they were
trying to drag the man out of
the house."
The investigating officer
said that when he entered the
living room of Roberts'
apartment he found blood
spattered on the couch and
floor. there was a path of
blood spatters which led from
the living room through the
dining room and kitchen and out
into the backyard. I followed
the blood spatters until I
found Fred Johnson's body.
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A little while later
David Jones, one of the
individuals who had gathered
that evening at Sally Roberts'
apartment, was arrested. Upon
questioning he told the police
that: "On March 23, 1981, he
was at Sally and Alice Roberts'
residence with Frank Smith and
Fred Johnson and while the
three of them were in the
living room, he (David Jones)
was sitting in a chair, Fred
Johnson was seated on the couch
and Frank Smith was standing 8
to 10 feet away from Fred
Johnson with a .22 caliber
revolver in his hand arguing
with Fred Johnson. He saw
Frank Smith point the gun at
Fred Johnson and after hearing
the shot, saw Fred Johnson with
lots of blood coming from his
face. Frank Smith was upset
because Fred Johnson had
promised to deliver drugs and
had failed to do so. Roberts'
house without Frank being
present."
He also said that:
Earlier that evening, when he,
Frank Smith and Fred Johnson
were at a different residence,
he saw Frank Smith point the
revolver at Fred Johnson and
heard him threaten to kill him.
The next day, Frank Smith
was arrested. In response to
questioning he denied shooting
Fred Johnson. He said that:
"He, Fred Johnson and David
Jones were in the living room
of Sally Roberts' residence
when he heard a shot and saw
Fred Johnson bleeding from his
face. He then told them (David
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Jones and Bill Sherman) to get
Fred Johnson's body out of the
house. At that time David
Jones gave him the gun which he
carried as the body was removed
from the house. They then left
the residence in Bill Sherman's
car. He then gave the gun back
to David Jones and when David
left the car he took the gun
with him."
Police say that Smith's
record shows drug related
arrested in 1979 and 1980.
According to one local bar
owner, Smith has been asked to
leave his establishment several
times due to excessive drinking
and rough behavior.
Frank Smith was
confronted by David Jones in
the District Attorney's Office
and made no response when David
Jones said that he saw Frank
Smith shoot Fred Johnson.
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COURT POSTPONES DRUG
RELATED MURDER TRIAL
by Dave Droege
Staff Writer
The trial of Frank Smith,
charged with first degree
murder, was postponed after a
brief hearing Tuesday in
Milwaukee County Common Pleas
Court. Smith had recently been
released from drug rehab.
Smith, 28, 3412 North
Seventh Street, Milwaukee, was
charged with first degree
murder in the March 23 slaying
of Fred Johnson. Johnson was
found dead in the alley behind
Smith's girlfriend's apartment.
Johnson had been shot in the
face.
No new date has been set
for Smith's trial. Smith will
be held in Milwaukee County
Jail until the trial.
When the case goes to
trial, Smith may not have to
appear in the courtroom.
Smith's attorneys--
William Coffee and William
Retert--and the Milwaukee
County Prosecutor's Office are
considering having testimony in
the trial videotaped for the
jury, eliminating the use of
live witnesses.
David Jones, the State's
witness, told police that on
March 23, 1981 he was at a
residence located at 5042 North
21st Street with the Frank
Smith and Fred Johnson. He
further stated that while he,
Smith, and Johnson were in the
living room in Roberts'
residence he observed Smith,
who had a .22 caliber revolver 84
in his hand, arguing with Fred
Johnson. He further stated
that Smith was upset with Fred
Johnson because Johnson had
been over to Smith's
girlfriend's, Sally Roberts,
house earlier in the evening
without Smith being present.
Smith had been arrested twice
previously for threatening to
kill a former employer and for
attempting to murder an
unfaithful girlfriend. Smith's
defense in both cases was
temporary insanity due to drug
use.
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DEFENDANT IN MURDER CASE
RETRACTS CONFESSION
by Dave Droege
Staff Writer
Two Milwaukee men, Frank
Smith and David Jones, were
arrested on charges of first
degree murder on March 23,
1981. Both men, along with
several others, had been
present when Fred Johnson was
shot at the home of Smith's
girlfriend. During police
interrogation, Smith confessed
to the murder saying that he
was "out of his head on dope
and furious because Johnson had
come on to his girl." At the
time of his arrest, Smith did
not know that Jones also was
being held on similar charges.
Finding out afterward that the
police suspected Jones as well
as himself, he withdrew his
confession saying that "the
drugs and pressure from the
police made him confess to a
murder that he did not commit."
The police polygrapher will
administer a lie-detector test
to determine whether or not
Smith is lying.
SUSPCT'S86
MURDER SUSPECT'S GIRLFRIEND
INCRIMINATES HIM
by Dave Droege
Staff Writer
Frank Smith, 28, 3412
North Seventh Street, Milwaukee
was charged with shooting Fred
Johnson in the face at his
girlfriend's house on March 23,
1981. Sally, Smith's
girlfriend, told police that
she and a friend were in the
kitchen when she heard a shot.
That she ran into the living
room and saw a man lying on the
couch and he was bleeding.
Frank was standing there.
Sally said she "thinks he was
trying to drag Johnson's body
out of the house." She said
she was "afraid that Frank
would shoot her too."
Apparently Sally's fear is
based on the knowledge that
Smith had been arrested twice
before on suspicion of murder.
Allegedly Smith had threatened
to kill a former employer for
failing to authorize a pay
raise and before that Smith had
attempted to kill an unfaithful
girlfriend. Smith's girlfriend
is the State's key witness in
the trial set for Jan. 6, 1982.
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APPENDIX D
Judge - Federal Voir Dire
Ladies and gentlemen I am Judge Moran and what we are about to do is
called the voir dire examination. The reason that these questions are
asked is not to pry into your personal affairs, that's not really the
intent here, it's simply to try to select a jury as impartial as possible.
INTRODUCE COUNSEL
1. Do you understand that the defendant has no burden to
prove his innocence?
2. Will you follow the law even though you might personally
disagree with it?
3. Do you have any relatives or friends who work in law
enforcement?
4. This trial involves allegations of first degree murder
against the defendant Frank Smith. Have you, your
family or any close acquaintance ever had an experience
that might prejudice you?
5. Have you heard or read anything from radio, television,
newspapers or the news media about this case?
6. Do you understand that the evidence which you will
evaluate in this case will come solely from the witness
stand and not from any other source?
7. Do you have any difficulty presuming the defendant
innocent now?
8. Will you follow the law as the court gives it to you and
thereafter base your verdict on the law and the evidence
introduced in this trial?
9. Do you know of any reason why you cannot be fair and
impartial at this time?
10. SWEAR THE JURY
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